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Abstract
Test-time adversarial attacks have posed serious challenges to the robustness of
machine learning models, and in many settings the adversarial manipulation needs
not be bounded by small ℓp-norms. Motivated by semantic-preserving attacks in
security domain, we investigate logical adversaries, a broad class of attackers who
create adversarial examples within a reflexive-transitive closure of a logical rela-
tion. We analyze the conditions for robustness and propose normalize-and-predict
– a learning framework with provable robustness guarantee. We compare our ap-
proach with adversarial training and derive a unified framework that provides the
benefits of both approaches. Driven by the theoretical findings, we apply our
framework to malware detection. We use our framework to learn new detectors
and propose two generic logical attacks to validate model robustness. Experiment
results on real-world data set show that attacks using logical relations can evade
existing detectors, and our unified framework can significantly enhance model
robustness.
1 Introduction
The robustness of machine learning (ML) systems has been challenged by test-time attacks using
adversarial examples [1, 2]. These adversarial examples are intentionally manipulated inputs that
preserve the essential characteristics of the original inputs, and thus are expected to have the same
test outcome as the originals by human standard; yet many ML models across different domains
have reported significantly reduced performance on them [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. As models in high-
stake domains such as system security are also undermined by attacks [10, 11, 12, 13, 14], robust
ML in adversarial test environment becomes an imperative task for the ML community.
While many defense mechanisms have been proposed [15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21], most existing
work considers ℓp-norm bounded adversarial manipulation. The ℓp-norm constraint assumes that
adversarial examples are syntactically similar to original inputs, e.g. two images close in pixel
values. However, in many security-critical settings, the adversarial examples need only preserve the
malicious semantics. For example, a spammer can add long wrapping texts to a phishing email: the
bag-of-word features of the new email will have large ℓp-distance from the original. Similarly, a
malware author can choose different APIs to implement the same malicious function: the modified
malware can have drastically different static program analysis features. Spam filters and malware
detectors need to be robust to such semantic-preserving, adversarial manipulations that may have
large ℓp-norm.
Recent work also has started to examine defenses against adversarial transformations beyond ℓp-
norm constraints, including adversarial training [10, 11, 14, 22], verification-loss regularization [23]
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and invariance-induced regularization [24]. Adversarial training in principle can achieve high robust
accuracy when the adversarial example in the training loop maximizes the loss. However, finding
such adversarial examples is in general NP-hard [25], and we show in Sec 3 that it is even PSPACE-
hard for semantics-preserving attacks. [23, 24] add regularizers that indicate model robustness to the
training objective. However, the regularizer’s value is not strictly enforced in training, and neither is
model robustness. These limitations can still cause vulnerability to semantic-preserving attacks.
In this paper, we attempt to overcome these limitations using a learning framework that guarantees
robustness by design. We investigate classification over binary inputs, and consider a logical adver-
sary, whose admissible manipulation is specified by a logical relation. A logical relation is a set of
input pairs, where each element specifies the source and target of an atomic input transformation and
the source and target have the same semantic in the application domain. We consider a strong adver-
sary that can apply arbitrary number of transformations because real-world attackers are often free
to edit their malicious content. Our paper makes the following contribution towards the theoretical
understanding of robust ML against logical adversaries:
1. We formally describe admissible adversarial manipulation using logical relations, and char-
acterize the necessary and sufficient conditions for robustness to logical adversaries.
2. We propose normalize-and-predict, a learning framework that first converts each data input
to a well-defined and unique normal form and then trains and classifies over the normalized
inputs. We show that our framework has guaranteed robustness, and characterize conditions
to different levels of robustness-accuracy trade-off.
3. We compare normalize-and-predict to the popular adversarial training framework, which
directly optimizes for accuracy under attacks. We show that normalize-and-predict has the
advantage in terms of explicit robustness guarantee and reduced training complexity, and in
certain case has the same accuracy as adversarial training. Motivated by the comparison, we
propose a unified framework, which selectively normalizes over more accuracy preserving
relations and adversarially trains over the rest. Our unified approach gets the benefits from
both frameworks.
We then apply our theoretical findings to malware detection. We formulate two types of common
program transformation – 1) addition of redundant libraries and API calls, and 2) substitution of
equivalent API calls – as logical relation. We instantiate our learning framework to these relations,
and propose two generic logical adversarial attacks to determine robustness. Finally, we perform
experiments over Sleipnir, a real-world WIN32 malware data set. Our results in Sec 5 show that:
1. Attacks using addition and substitution relation suffice to evade existing ML detectors.
2. Our unified approach using input normalization and adversarial training achieves highest
robust accuracy among all baselines. The drop in accuracy on clean inputs is small and the
computation cost is lower than pure adversarial training.
Finally, based on our theoretical and empirical results, we conclude that input normalization is vital
to robust learning against logical adversaries. We believe that techniques that can improve the quality
of normalization, such as transformation rule detection and semantic-aware feature extraction, are
promising directions for future work.
Related Work. Test-time attacks in binary-input classification has recently caused severe security
concerns, as ML models in security tasks are vulnerable to adversarial manipulation: [10, 11] evade
API/library usage based malware detectors by adding redundant API calls and [12, 13, 14] attack
running-time behavior based detectors via adding redundant execution traces. Instead of considering
application-specific addition attacks, our paper extends the scope of adversarial attacks to general
logical transformation: we unify the threat models into a powerful logical adversary, which can
readily incorporate more complex input transformations. Our attacks surpass addition attacks on
standard malware detection data set, suggesting the necessity of studying general logical adversary.
On the defense end, the work closest to ours in spirit is [24], which attempts to make model predic-
tion invariant to input transformations. Their work however differs from ours in two major ways.
First, they consider spatial transformation of images – the inputs form closed groups under trans-
formation. Our logical adversary is more general as the transformations need not have an inverse.
Second, their defense uses an invariance-induced regularizer, which may not enforce robustness on
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finite sample. In contrast, our framework enforces robustness by design. [10, 11, 14] improve ro-
bustness via adversarial training; we show such approach is also hard to optimize. Last, [26, 27]
enforce monotonicity over model outputs so that addition in feature values can only increase the
maliciousness score. These approaches are specific for addition attacks and only protect one class.
Normalization is a technique to reduce the number of syntactically distinct instances that need to be
considered by the detection system. First introduced to network security in the early 2000s in the
context of network intrusion detection systems [28] and later applied to malware detection [29], it is
used in various classical malware detectors [30, 31, 32, 33]. Our work addresses the open question
whether normalization is useful for ML under logical adversary by invesigating its impact on both
robustness and accuracy.
2 Background
In this section, we introduce the learning setting and the threat model. We first describe the learning
task, then formalize the potential adversarial manipulation as logical relations, and eventually derive
the notion of robustness to logical adversaries.
Learning Task. We consider a data distribution D over a d-dimensional binary input space X =
{0, 1}d and categorical label space Y . We use bold face letters, e.g. x, for input vectors and y
for the label. Given a hypothesis class H, the learner wants to learn a classifier f : X → Y in
H that minimizes the risk over the data distribution. In non-adversarial settings, the learner solves
minf∈H E(x,y)∼D ℓ(f,x, y), where ℓ is a loss function. For classification, ℓ(f,x, y) = 1(f(x) 6=
y).
Logical Relation. A relation R is a subset of {0, 1}d × {0, 1}d. We write x →R z iff (x, z) ∈ R.
We write x →∗R z iff x = z or there exists z0, z1, · · · , zk (k > 0) such that x = z0, zi →R zi+1
(0 ≤ i < k) and zk = z. In other words,→∗R is the reflexive-transitive closure of→R. A relation is
naturally ‘logical’ because its element can be described using logical statement, and the following
illustrative examples show two common relations.
Example 1 (Additive relation). In an additive relationR, x→R z iff xi = 1 =⇒ zi = 1 for all i.
Intuitively, it means x can be transformed to z by changing feature values from 0 to 1.
Example 2 (Equivalence relation induced by equivalent coordinates). Let I = {1, · · · , d} be the
set of coordinate indices for inputs in X and U = {i1, · · · , im} ⊆ I . In an equivalence relation
R induced by U , x →R z iff 1) xi = zi for all i ∈ I\U , and 2)
∨
i∈U xi =
∨
i∈U zi. Notice that
x →R z iff z →R x. Intuitively, it means the presence of any combination of coordinates in U is
equivalent to any other combination.
In this paper, we also consider unions of relations. Notice that a finite union R of m relations
R1, · · · ,Rm is also a relation, and x→R z iff x→Ri z for some i ∈ {1, · · · ,m}.
Threat Model. A test-time adversary replaces a clean test input xwith an adversarially manipulated
input A(x), where A(·) represents the attack algorithm. We consider an adversary who wants to
maximize the classification error rate:
E
(x,y)∼D
1(f(A(x)) 6= y).
We assume white-box attacks1, i.e. the adversary knows all information about f , including its struc-
tures, model parameters and any defense mechanism in place. To maintain the malicious semantics,
the adversarial input A(x) needs to be within a feasible set T (x). In this paper, we focus on T (x)
described by logical relation. We consider a logical relationR that is known to both the learner and
the adversary, and we define a logical adversary as the following.
Definition 1 (Logical adversary). An adversary is said to beR-logical if T (x) = {z |x→∗R z}, i.e.
each element in R represents an admissible transformation, and the adversary can apply arbitrary
number of transformation specified byR.
We can then define the robustness of a classifier f by how often its prediction is consistent under
attack, and robust accuracy as the fraction of prediction that is both robust and accurate.
1We consider a strong white-box attacker to avoid interference from security by obscurity, which is shown
fragile in various other adversarial settings [16].
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Definition 2 (Robustness and robust accuracy). Let Q(R, f,x) be the following statement:
∀ z((x→∗R z)⇒ f(x) = f(z)).
Then, a classifier f is robust at x if Q(R, f,x) is true, and the robustness of f to an R-logical
adversary is:
E
x∼DX
1Q(R,f,x),
where 1(·) indicates the truth value of a statement and DX is the marginal distribution over inputs.
The robust accuracy of f w.r.t. anR-logical adversary is then:
E
(x,y)∼D
1Q(R,f,x)∧f(x)=y.
Notice that the robust accuracy of a classifier is no more than the robustness in value because of
the extra requirement of f(x) = y. Meanwhile, a classifier with the highest robustness accuracy
may not always have the highest robustness and vice versa: an intuitive example is that a constant
classifier is always robust but not necessarily robustly accurate. In Sec 3, we will discuss both
objectives and characterize the trade-off between them.
3 Normalize-and-Predict – A Provably Robust Learning Framework
In this section, we introduce normalize-and-predict, a learning framework provably robust to an
R-logical adversary. We first analyze the conditions for robustness on a graph induced by logical
relation. Inspired by the observation, we then propose a normalization procedure, which converts
each input instance into a well-defined normal form. In the normalize-and-predict framework, the
learner both trains and tests over the normal forms instead of the original inputs. Finally, we compare
our approach with adversarial training and suggest a unified framework based on comparison.
3.1 Conditions for Robustness
We first define a directed graphGR = (V,E), which we call the relation graph ofR, that is induced
by a relation R. The vertex set V contains all elements in X , i.e. all lattices in {0, 1}d. The
edge set E contains an edge (x, z) iff (x, z) ∈ R. Then, a directed path exists from x to z iff
x→∗R z. Let C1, · · · , Ck denote the weakly connected components inG. We observe the following
necessary and sufficient condition for robustness in a weakly connected component, which we prove
in Appendix A.
Observation 1. A classifier f is robust for all x ∈ Ci iff f(x) returns the same label for all x ∈ Ci.
The if direction holds because any x ∈ Ci can only be transformed into z ∈ Ci by the maximal
property of weakly connected component. The contrapositive of the only if direction holds because
if f(x) 6= f(z) for a pair x, z ∈ Ci, then there must exist two adjacent nodes z1, z2 on the path
between x and z such that one can be transformed to another yet f(z1) 6= f(z2).
3.2 The Normalize-and-Predict Framework
Observation 1 suggests that inputs in the same connected component must have the same prediction
in order to obtain robustness. This motivates us to find a single input – a unique “normal” form –
that represents all inputs in the connected component. If we can define a normal form and find a
systematic way to convert all test inputs to their normal forms, then all adversarial examples of an
input instance will share the same normal form, and thus have the same prediction.
Normal Form. LetCi be any weakly connected component inGR induced byR. We first construct
a new graph from Ci by condensing all nodes in the same cycle into a single node for all cycles in
Ci. Suppose S = {x1, · · · ,xm} is the set of nodes in a cycle. We only keep x1 in the graph, and
replace edge (xi, z) with (x1, z) and edge (z,xi) with (z,x1) for all xi ∈ S and all z in the graph.
We repeat this procedure until no cycle exists in the remaining graph, and we call the final graph C′i .
Since C′i is acyclic by construction, we can fix a topological order over its nodes.
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Table 1: Comparison of training objective and test output for standard risk minimization learning
scheme, normalize-and-predict and adversarial training. The upper row shows the training objec-
tives; the lower row shows the test output, where f∗ is the minimizer of the training objective.
No Defense Normalize-and-Predict Adversarial Training
Train min
f
∑
(x,y)∈D
ℓ(f,x, y) min
f
∑
(x,y)∈D
ℓ(f,N (x), y) min
f
max
A(·)
∑
(x,y)∈D
ℓ(f,A(x), y)
Test f∗(x) f∗(N (x)) f∗(x)
Definition 3 (Normal form). For any Ci and any node x ∈ Ci, the normal form of x, denoted by
N (x), is the node in C′i with the largest topological order.
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Normalize-and-Predict. In the normalize-and-predict framework, the learner both trains the classi-
fier and predicts the test label over the normal form of the original input. Let D denote the training
set. In the empirical risk minimization learning scheme, the learner will now solve the following
problem
min
f∈H
∑
(x,y)∈D
ℓ(f,N (x), y), (1)
and use the minimizer f∗ as the classifier. During test-time, the model will predict f∗(N (x)).
Table 1 compares the learning pipeline of normalize-and-predict to normal risk minimization and
adversarial training. We characterize the robustness and robust accuracy of the classifier learned
using the normalize-and-predict framework in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let f be a classifier obtained using the normalize-and-predict framework, and f(Ci)
be the class label that f assigns to connected component Ci. Let µ(x) denote the probability mass
of x and η(x, l) = Pr(y = l|x) denote the probability that x has label l. Then
1. f is always robust to R-logical adversaries,
2. the accuracy of f , denoted by Accf,R, will be:
∑
Ci
∑
x∈Ci
µ(x)η(x, f(Ci)).
In addition, the best robust accuracy using normalize-and-predict, denoted byAcc∗R, has expression
Acc∗R =
∑
Ci
max
l∈Y
∑
x∈Ci
µ(x)η(x, l),
which happens when f(Ci) = argmaxl∈Y
∑
x∈Ci
µ(x)η(x, l).
The proof is in Appendix A.1. The robustness of f is guaranteed as a result of Observation 1. For
accuracy, the term maxl∈Y
∑
x∈Ci
µ(x)η(x, l) intuitively measures how concentrated the labels of
random samples are within Ci, and the accuracy will be high if x ∈ Ci shares the same label.
Robustness-Accuracy Trade-off. Theorem 1 suggests that robust accuracy depends on both the
data distribution D and the relation R: the latter determines the graph structure. We observe that
adding elements into R, which means allowing more admissible transformation, will always have
negative impact on the robust accuracy except one special case as shown in Observation 2.
Observation 2 (Robustness-accuracy trade-off). Let R′ and R be two relations such that R′ =
R
⋃
{(x, z)}, i.e. R′ allows an extra transformation from x to z than R. Let Cx,R denote the
weakly connected component in GR that contains x, and lC be the most likely label of inputs in a
connect component C. Then Acc∗R′ − Acc
∗
R ≤ 0 for all R,R
′ pairs, and the equality only holds
when lCx,R = lCz,R .
The proof is in Appendix A.2; the intuition is that the extra edge on the relation graph may join two
connected components, and the accuracy on one of the components will drop if the two components
have different majority labels.
We further characterize three levels of trade-off with illustrative examples in Figure 1. First, if x, z
have the same ground truth label, then the optimal classifier over the data distributionD after normal-
ization should have the same natural accuracy as before normalization. Second, if both (x, z) and
2In fact, the normal form can also be any element in Ci as long as it is consistent for all x ∈ Ci. Topological
order helps us to find such a consistent choice algorithmically.
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x z x z xz1 z2
Figure. 1: Relations with different robustness-accuracy trade-off. Different node colors indicate
different ground truth labels for the inputs. Left: normalization preserves natural accuracy; Mid-
dle: normalization preserves robust accuracy; Right: normalization will cause suboptimal robust
accuracy.
(z,x) are inR, then as we show later in Theorem 2, the optimal classifier overD after normalization
has the same robust accuracy as the optimal classifier under adversarial training, i.e. normalization
preserves the best attainable robust accuracy. Last, if x can be transformed to different inputs with
different ground truth labels, then having an absolutely robust classifier is at odds with robust ac-
curacy. Suppose µ(x) = 0.02, µ(z1) = µ(z2) = 0.49 in the rightmost example in Figure 1. The
classifier after normalization will predict the same label and thus has accuracy at most 0.49, while
the highest robust accuracy is 0.98 by predicting the ground truth label for z1 and z2.
3.3 Comparison and Synergy with Adversarial Training
Normalize-and-Predict differs from the popular adversarial training framework in their objectives:
normalize-and-predict prioritizes robustness and then maximizes accuracy under the guarantee,
while adversarial training maximizes robust accuracy at the cost of potential violation to robustness.
In theory, adversarial training may have higher robust accuracy when ideally optimizing its objective.
However, the following observations suggest that its training complexity maybe prohibitively high.
Observation 3 (Hardness of training). The inner optimization problem of adversarial training is
PSPACE-hard for logical adversary.
Observation 4 (Model capacity requirement). For some hypothesis class H and relation R, there
exists f ∈ H such that f(NR(·)) is robustly accurate, but no f ∈ H can be robustly accurate on the
original inputs. In other words, robustly accurate classifier can only be obtained after normalization,
suggesting that adversarial training may require larger model capacity. 3
The full statements and proofs of Observation 3 and 4 are in AppendixA.3 and A.4. In addition to the
computational hardness of inner maximization and the potential higher model capacity requirements,
previous work has also shown that robust learning may also have high sample complexity [34].
These factors together suggest that adversarial training may be suboptimal in practice.
Given the comparison of these two approaches, we propose a synergy of them that may enjoy the
robustness guarantee and reduced training complexity of normalize-and-predict as well as the po-
tential higher accuracy of adversarial training. For a relation R, we strategically select a subset
R′ ⊂ R, normalize inputs w.r.t. R′, and adversarially train on the normalized inputs. Let NR′(x)
denote the normal form of x underR′. Formally, the learner solve the following problem
min
f∈H
max
A(·)
∑
(x,y)∈D
ℓ (f,A (NR′(x)) , y) , (2)
during training to obtain a minimizer f∗, and predicts f∗(NR′(x)) at test-time. The classifier f∗
will be robust to R′-logical adversary, and have potentially higher accuracy to transformations in
R\R′ than using normalization alone. For choice of R′, we characterize a condition for which
normalize-and-predict and adversarial training have the same best attainable robust accuracy.
Theorem 2 (Preservation of robust accuracy). Consider H to be the set of all labeling functions
on {0, 1}d. Let f∗ be the classifier that minimizes the objective of our unified framework over data
distribution D, i.e. the optimal solution to
min
f∈H
max
A(·)
E
(x,y)∼D
ℓ (f,A (NR′(x)) , y) ,
where ℓ is the 0-1 classification. Meanwhile, let f∗adv be the classifier that minimizes the objective
of adversarial training over D, i.e. the optimal solution to
min
f∈H
max
A(·)
E
(x,y)∼D
ℓ(f,A(x), y).
3We note that robust learning may already have high sample complexity [34]; reducing model capacity may
help reduce the sample requirement too.
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In addition, let GR′ denote the relation graph of R′. Then, f∗(NR′(·)) and f∗adv have the same
robust accuracy if the connected components in GR′ are also strongly connected.
The proof is in Appendix A.5; the intuition is that we can find a classifier f in our unified framework
such that f∗adv is only robustly accurate when f(NR′(·)) is. Observation 2 and Theorem 2 provide
a general guideline for selecting R′: we choose, with highest priority, the relation that leads to
strongly connected components in its relation graph, and then consider relation that cause little drop
in the best attainable robust accuracy.
4 Case Study: Robust Malware Detection
We now examine a security-critical domain – malware detection – in which robustness to logical ad-
versary is crucial. Malware authors can edit the malware syntax while retain the malicious function-
ality in order to evade detection. We first show that common obfuscation techniques can be described
by logical transformation on the feature vector, and then show two practical attacks, GREEDYBY-
GROUP and GREEDYBYGRAD, that use such logical transformation. Last, we describe our unified
learning framework using both normalization and adversarial training, whose performance will be
evaluated in the experiment section.
4.1 Adversarial Settings
One popular scheme of ML-basedmalware detection is to first extract a binary feature representation
x ∈ {0, 1}d of a program,which indicates its usage of libraries and API calls. The learner then builds
classifiers over the extracted feature vectors, which ideally assign y = 1 to the malware and y = 0
otherwise. A common attack strategy studied in previous work is addition attack [10, 11, 12, 13, 14]:
the attacker adds dummy API calls and import extra libraries to change the program syntax. Such
transformation can be described using the additive relation in Example 1.
However, the attacker can perform a much richer set of transformation, which is not considered by
previous work. We observe that the same program functionality typically can be implemented in
different ways, using different sets of APIs. We consider a special case: API substitutions. APIs
with similar functionality can be used interchangeably, without changing the program functionality.
API substitution can be described by the equivalence relation in Example 2.
Formally, given a detector f : {0, 1}d → {0, 1}, a malware instance x with label y = 1, and
a relation R, the attacker wants to create a new malware with representation xadv that solves:
maxz:x→∗
R
z ℓ(f, z, y).
Algorithm 1 GREEDYBYGROUP (x,K)
x
adv = x, k = 0
PartitionR intom groups {R1, · · · ,Rm}.
while k < K do
k = k + 1
forRi ∈ {R1, · · · ,Rm} do
xi = arg max
z:xadv→∗
Ri
z
ℓ(f, z, 1).
end
Combine xis to obtain the new x
adv
end
return xadv
Algorithm 2 GREEDYBYGRAD(x,m,K)
x
adv = x, k = 0
while k < K do
k = k + 1
g = ∇xℓ(f,x, 1)
for (xadv, z) ∈ R do
c(xadv ,z) =
∑d
i=1 gi(zi−x
adv
i )
end
Apply the transformations with top m largest
positive c(xadv,z) to obtain the new x
adv.
end
return xadv
4.2 Attack Algorithms
We propose two logical attacks to validate the effectiveness of our unified approach. Both algorithms
are greedy in nature and iteratively improve the adversarial objectives. We will explain the generic
attack frameworks, followed by their instantiation for feature addition and substitution.
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The GREEDYBYGROUP algorithm takes a test input vector x and a maximum number of iterations
K . In each iteration, it partitions R into subsets of relations R1, · · · ,Rm, and finds the instance
within the transitive closure of each Ri that maximizes the loss. These instances from all Ris are
combined to create the new version of xadv.
We first breakR into additive and equivalence relations. Each equivalence relation is characterized
by an equivalent API group, which contains all APIs with the same functionality. Within each group,
we search the combination of API usage that maximizes the test loss ℓ. 4 For additive relation, we
use attacks in [11] to find an additive adversarial example. In our experiments, we find that is
it computationally intensive to search all equivalence and additive partitions in one iteration. An
effective simplification is to search only additive partitions in the first half of iterations and then
search only equivalence partitions in the second half of iterations.
The GREEDYBYGRAD algorithm takes a test input vector x, a maximum numberm of transforma-
tion to apply in each iteration, and a maximum number of iteration K . In each iteration, it makes
a first-order approximation of the change in ℓ caused by each transformation, and then applies the
transformations with topm approximated increases in ℓ to create the new version of xadv.
In each iteration, we maintain a list of available transformation that includes 1) change any feature’s
value from 0 to 1, and 2) change an API’s feature value from 1 to 0 and assign 1 to the feature of an
equivalent API. We apply transformations with topm largest approximated increase in ℓ.
4.3 Robust Learning Strategy
We use normalization for equivalence relation and adversarial training for additive relation. The
relation graph of equivalence relation satisfies the condition in Theorem 2, and therefore normalizing
over the equivalence relation will not cause extra loss in robust accuracy compared to adversarial
training. In contrast, transformations in additive relation may cause loss in robust accuracy, and thus
is more suitable for adversarial training.
For each equivalent API group, we replace the API features with a single meta feature. The normal-
izerN (·) assigns 1 to the meta feature if any API in the equivalent group is present, and 0 otherwise.
We then adversarially train the classifier over the normalized inputs.
5 Experiment
We evaluate the effectiveness of our unified framework to logical adversaries using GREEDYBY-
GROUP and GREEDYBYGRAD. Our evaluation aims to answer the following questions:
1. Do logical attacks pose real threats to existing ML-based malware detectors?
2. How effective is our unified framework in enhancing robustness, and do the results corrob-
orate with the theory?
We investigate these aspects over Sleipnir, a real-world WIN32 malware data set that has also been
a benchmark for addition attack [11]. Our result shows that our new logical attacks can effectively
evade the detector adversarially trained with additive attacks. In contrast, the detector obtained from
our unified approach has the highest robustness. In addition, our approach reduces the training time
cost compared to pure adversarial training.
5.1 Experiment Methodology
Baselines Detectors and Attacks. We compare four ML detectors. The Unified detector is trained
with our synergy of normalization and adversarial training in Sec 4. The Adv-Trained detector is
obtained via adversarial training, where the inner maximization returns the best adversarial example
generated using our GREEDYBYGRAD and the addition attack in [11].5 The Al-Dujaili et al. model
is a benchmark from [11], which is adversarially trained against only addition attack. Finally, the
4For small groups, we enumerate every possible combination. For large groups, we randomly sample a
number of combinations and choose the one with the largest loss.
5GREEDYBYGROUP is too computationally expensive to be included in the training loop.
8
Table 2: Evaluation results. Each column represents a baseline detector, whereas each row repre-
sents one attack method, with Natural representing no attack. We present the False Negative Rate
(FNR) and False Positive Rate (FPR) for each baseline in the format of mean±standard deviation.
Natural Unified (Ours) Adv-Trained Al-Dujaili et al. [11]
FNR(%) FPR(%) FNR(%) FPR(%) FNR(%) FPR(%) FNR(%) FPR(%)
Natural 6.2±0.6 10.0±0.6 5.0±0.4 11.9±1.2 5.8±0.9 12.1±1.2 6.4±0.5 10.7±0.3
META 100±0.0 10.0±0.6 5.5±0.5 11.9±1.2 6.8±1.1 12.1±1.2 89.9±7.8 10.7±0.3
GREEDYBYGROUP 100±0.0 10.0±0.6 5.5±0.5 11.9±1.2 27.9±8.2 12.1±1.2 75.8±3.1 10.7±0.3
Natural model is trained with no defense. For attacks, we use GREEDYBYGRAD, GREEDYBY-
GROUP and the rfgsm_k addition attack in [11].
Data Sets. The data set contains Windows binary API usage features of 34,995 malware and 19,696
benign software, extracted from their Portable Executable (PE) files using LIEF. There are 22,761
unique API calls in the data set, so each PE file is represented by a binary indicator vector x ∈
{0, 1}m, wherem = 22, 761. We sample 19,000 benign PEs and 19,000 malicious PEs to construct
the training (60%), validation (20%), and test (20%) sets.
Model Structure. We use a fully-connected neural net with three hidden layer, each with 300 ReLU
nodes. This model structure is the same as in [11] to allow fair comparison to its baseline.
Equivalence Relation. We identify four types of patterns for extracting equivalent APIs:
• API with the same name but located in different Dynamically Linkable Libraries (DLLs). For
example, memcpy, a standard C library function, is shipped in libraries with different names,
including crtdll.dll, msvcr90.dll, and msvcr110.dll.
• API with and without the Ex suffix. The Ex suffix represents an extension to the same API without
the suffix.
• API with and without the A or W suffixes. The A suffix represents the single character version. The
W suffix represents the wide character version.
• API with/without _s suffix. The _s suffix represents the secure version of an API.
Using these four patterns, we extracted about 2,000 equivalent API groups. About 500 of the groups
have more than 2 APIs and the maximal group has 23 APIs.
Experiment Procedure. For each baseline, we train to minimize the NLL loss for 20 epochs, and
pick the model with the lowest loss on the validation set. We run five different train/test data set
splits. The parameters for attacks in training and evading stages are set as follows.
1. rfgsm_k: we use the default attack parameters in [11] and set the number of attack itera-
tions to 50.
2. META: we use both rfgsm_k and GREEDYBYGRAD attacks in the training loop to gen-
erate adversarial examples, and pick the adversarial example with the highest loss. For
GREEDYBYGRAD, we run 5 iterations and in each iteration apply 10 transformations for
both training and evading. We also consider two different GREEDYBYGRAD strategy, one
considers both additive and equivalence relation and the other considers only additive rela-
tion.
3. GREEDYBYGROUP: We first run rfgsm_k for 50 iterations to create intermediate adversar-
ial examples using additive relation. We then run 20 iterations for the equivalence relation,
and in each iteration, sample 210 different combinations of API usage within each equiva-
lence relation.
In addition, we assign a higher weight (1.2x) to the loss on malware instances to encourage less
FNR; users who desire more robustness to evasion attack are likely working in more security critical
domains, and thus low FNR may better align with their interest.
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5.2 Experiment Results
We present the results in Table 2. Each column represents a baseline detector, whereas each row
represents one attack method. The first row reports the test error rate on clean inputs. The second
row reports the error rate on adversarial examples created by the META attack used in the training
loop of Adv-Trained. The third row reports the error rate against GREEDYBYGROUP; this attack is
omitted in adversarial training due to its high computational cost.
Effectiveness of Logical Attacks. As shown in Table 2, logical attacks are overwhelmingly effective
to detectors that are oblivious to potential logical transformations. The adversarial examples can
almost always (>99% FNR) evade the naturally trained model, and also can evade the detector
in [11] most of the time (>89% FNR) as the detector does not consider API substitution.6
Robustness of Detectors. Our unified approach achieves the highest robustness, as the evasion
rate (FNR) only increases by 0.5% on average. The Adv-Trained detector is the second robust
but still has 22.1% increase in evasion rate. It is mostly evaded by GREEDYBYGROUP, the attack
that is too computationally expensive to be included in the training loop. This result corroborates
with the expected advantage of normalization: its robustness guarantee does not depend on specific
training algorithms. In contrast, the robustness of adversarial training depends on the strength of the
attacks used in the inner maximization loop; when encountered with different attacks, its robustness
may decrease. Last, in terms of accuracy on clean test inputs, all detectors using robust learning
techniques have higher FPR compared to Natural, which is also expected because of the inevitable
robustness-accuracy trade-off. However, the difference is much smaller compared to the cost due to
evasion attacks, and thus the trade-off is worthwhile.
Training Time Cost. We run the experiment on a desktop computer with an Intel i7 CPU and
a Nvidia 1080ti GPU. Our unified framework takes about 0.5 second to iterate 100 training inputs,
which is comparable to [11]. In contrast, adversarial training using GREEDYBYGRAD in the training
loop takes more than 5 seconds for every 100 training inputs; the main bottleneck is finding the
best adversarial transformation, which requires enumeration over all admissible transformations. In
addition, we also note that GREEDYBYGROUP takes hours to generate adversarial examples, and
thus cannot be used in the training loop. Normalization shows its advantage in training complexity,
as the normalizer for equivalence relation is simple and incurs only small overhead. In contrast,
the computation cost of the inner maximization loop limits the use of strong but computationally
intensive attacks.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we set the first step towards robust learning against logical adversaries: we theoretically
characterize the conditions for robustness and the sources of robustness-accuracy trade-off, and pro-
pose a provably robust learning framework. Our empirical evaluation shows that a combination of
input normalization and adversarial training can significantly enhance model robustness. For future
work, we see automatic detection of semantic-preserving transformation as a promising addition to
our current expert knowledge approach, and want to explore semantically richer representation of
program that enables better robustness-accuracy trade-off.
6For naturally trained models, there are a few test examples that can withstand evasion attack in some runs.
However, the number is too small so the average and standard deviation in Table 2 are rounded to 100 and 0.0,
respectively.
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A Proofs for Theorems and Observations
In this section, we present the omitted proofs for theorems and observations due to page limit of the
main body.
A.1 Proof to Theorem 1
Proof. The robustness result is a natural consequence of Observation 1: the normalization procedure
ensures that inputs in the same weakly connected component (WCC) on the relation graph will have
the same normal form, and thus have the same prediction. The robustness is then guaranteed by the
if direction of Observation 1.
The accuracy result is obtained by expressing robust accuracy in terms of the marginal distribution
µ over inputs and the labeling function η as the following.
Accf,R = E
(x,y)∼D
1Q(R,f,x)∧f(x)=y
= E
(x,y)∼D
1f(x)=y (f is always robust)
=
∑
x
µ(x)1f(x)=y (definition of expectation)
=
∑
Ci
∑
x∈Ci
µ(x)1f(x)=y (partition of input space by WCC)
=
∑
Ci
∑
x∈Ci
µ(x)η(x, f(x)) (definition of labeling function η)
=
∑
Ci
∑
x∈Ci
µ(x)η(x, f(Ci)). (f predicts the same in Ci.)
The best robust accuracy is then achieved when the accuracy in each weakly connected component
is maximized.
A.2 Proof to Observation 2
We first write the full version for Observation 2 in the following claim.
Claim 1. Let R′ and R be two relations such that R′ = R
⋃
{(x, z)}, i.e. R′ allows an extra
transformation from x to z than R. Let GR, GR′ denote their relation graphs and Cx,R be the
weakly connected component (WCC) in GR that contains x. In addition, let µ, η be the same as
defined in Theorem 1, and lC = argmaxl∈Y
∑
x∈C µ(x)η(x, l), i.e. the most likely label of inputs
in C. Then the change of best attainable robust accuracy fromR to R′, denoted by∆R,R′ , is
∆R,R′ = Acc
∗
R′ −Acc
∗
R (3)
=
∑
x
′∈C
x,R′
µ(x′)η(x, lC
x,R′
)−

 ∑
x
′∈Cx,R
µ(x′)η(x′, lCx,R) +
∑
x
′∈Cz,R\Cx,R
µ(x′)η(x′, lCz,R)

 .
(4)
The change∆R,R′ ≤ 0 for allR,R′ pairs, and the equality only holds when lCx,R = lCz,R .
Proof. First, we observe that Cx,R′ = Cx,R
⋃
Cz,R. Notice that (x, z) will not change the graph
structure outside Cx,R
⋃
Cz,R: the maximal property of WCC guarantees that neither x nor z con-
nect to nodes outside their own WCC. If Cx,R and Cz,R are two disjoint WCCs, then the path
x →R z will join them to form Cz,R′ . Otherwise, x, z are already in the same WCC, and thus
Cx,R′ = Cx,R = Cz,R.
Since the graph structure outside Cx,R′ does not change, it suffices to only look at change of best
robust accuracy within Cx,R′ . The term
∑
x
′∈C
x,R′
µ(x′)η(x, lC
x,R′
) is the best robust accuracy in
Cx,R′ . WhenCx,R 6= Cz,R, the term
∑
x
′∈Cx,R
µ(x′)η(x′, lCx,R) and
∑
x
′∈Cz,R\Cx,R
µ(x′)η(x′, lCz,R)
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are the best robust accuracy in Cx,R and Cz,R, respectively. When Cx,R = Cz,R, the latter term
becomes zero and the former is the best robust accuracy in Cx,R. In both cases, the equation in
Claim 1 holds by definition.
Next, we show ∆R,R′ ≤ 0. First, consider lCx,R 6= lCz,R . No matter what lCx,R′ is, it will be
different from at least one of lCx,R , lCz,R . Suppose, lCx,R′ 6= lCx,R , then the robust accuracy for
inputs in Cx,R will drop. Similarly, the accuracy in Cz,R will drop if lC
x,R′
6= lCz,R . Therefore,
∆R,R′ < 0. Second, when lCx,R = lCz,R , then we will have lCx,R′ = lCx,R = lCz,R by definition,
and the expression for∆R,R′ will evaluate to 0.
We also note that if the majority label lC,R is not unique for Cx,R and/or Cz,R, then we consider
lCx,R = lCz,R if any majority label for Cx,R matches any one for Cz,R.
A.3 Proof to Observation 3
We first write the full statement of Observation 3 in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. LetR ⊆ {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n be a relation. Given a function f , an input x ∈ {0, 1}d and
a feasible set T (x) = {z : x→∗R z}, solving the following maximization problem:
max
z∈T (x)
l(f, z, y)
is PSPACE-hard when l(f,x, y) is the 0-1 classification loss.
Proof. Let α : {0, 1}d → {0, 1} be a predicate. Define a loss function l(f, z, y) as fol-
lows: l(f, z, y) = α(z) (the loss function is essentially the value of the predicate). Note that
max
z∈T (x) l(f, z, y) is equal to 1 iff there exists a z ∈ T (x) such that α(z) = 1. This is a well
known problem in model checking called reachability analysis, which is well known to be PSPACE-
complete (the reduction is from the problem of checking emptiness for a set of DFAs, which is
known to be PSPACE-complete [35]).
Recall that the maximation problem max
z∈Bp(x,ǫ) l(f, z, y) used in adversarial training for the im-
age modality was proven to be NP-hard [25]. Hence it seems that the robust optimization problem
in our context is in a higher complexity class than in the image domain.
A.4 Proof to Observation 4
We first write the formal statement of the observation in the following claim.
Claim 2. Consider X = {0, 1}d and Y = {0, 1}. Suppose there exist a set of features
{x1,x′1,x2,x3,x4} such that x1 and x
′
1 satisfy the equivalence relation in Example 2, and y = 1
iff any of the following is true: 1) (x2 = 1) ∧ (x3 = 1), 2) (x1 ∨x′1 = 1) ∧ (x2 = 1), 3)
(x1 ∨x′1 = 1) ∧ (x3 = 1) ∧ (x4 = 1). Then
1. no linear model can classify the inputs with perfect robust accuracy, but
2. a robust and accurate linear model exists under normalize-and-predict.
Proof. Let H = {fw,b : sgn(〈w,x〉 + b)}. Let w1,w′1,w2,w3,w4 denote the coordinates in w
that corresponds to x1,x
′
1,x2,x3,x4. Let c be the contribution to the prediction score from features
other than x1,x
′
1,x2,x3,x4, i.e.
c = 〈w,x〉+ b−

 ∑
i∈{1,2,3,4}
wi xi

−w′1 x′1 .
In order to classify all possible x correctly, the classifier fw,b must satisfy
w2+w4+c < 0 (5)
w2+w
′
1+c > 0 (6)
w3 +w1+w
′
1+c < 0 (7)
w3 +w4+w1+c > 0 (8)
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First, by Formula 5 and 6, we have w1 > w4 and w
′
1 > w4. However, by Formula 7 and 8, we
have w1+w
′
1 < w4+w1, which implies w
′
1 < w4. Contradition. Therefore, no linear classifier
can satisfy all the equations.
On the other hand, if we perform normalization by letting x1 = x1 ∨x′1 and removing x
′
1, then a
classifier fw,b – with w1 = 0.4,w2 = 0.7,w3 = 0.5,w4 = 0.2, b = −1 and the rest wi set to 0 –
can perfectly classify x.
A.5 Proof to Theorem 2
Proof. We know by definition that f∗adv has the highest possible robust accuracy. Therefore, it
suffices to show that there exists a classifier f(NR′(·)) under our unified framework that has at least
as good robust accuracy as f∗adv.
We consider an f under our unified framework as follows. Let C denote a connected component
(which is also strongly connected)C inGR′ and YC be the set of all labels that f∗adv assign to inputs
in C, i.e. YC = {y ∈ Y |∃x ∈ C s.t. f∗adv(x) = y}. Let Cx denote the connected component
which contains x. We consider a classifier f such that
f(x) = arg max
l∈YCx
E
(z,y)∼D
1(z ∈ Cx ∧ y = l), (9)
i.e. f predicts the same label for all inputs in a connected component, and chooses the label that
maximizes the clean accuracy in the connected component. Notice that f(x) = f(NR′(x)) by
construction, so we will use f(x) instead of f(NR′(x) for simplicity.
Recall that we say a classifier f is robustly accurate over an input-label pair (x, y) under R if and
only if f(z) = y for all z : x→∗R z. Now to show that f with the prediction rule in Equation 9 has
the same robust accuracy as f∗adv, we prove the following claim.
Claim 3. The classifier f is robustly accurate over (x, y) underR if f∗adv is robustly accurate (x, y)
underR.
We prove the contrapositive of the claim. Suppose f is not robustly accurate over (x, y). Let z
denote the input such thatNR′(x)→∗R\R′ z and f(z) 6= y.
First, we notice that NR′(x) →∗R\R′ z implies x →
∗
R z: we know x →
∗
R′ NR′(x) because the
connected components in GR′ are strongly connected, and therefore an attacker can first transform
x to NR′(x) using rules in R′, and then transfromNR′(x) to z using rules in R\R′.
Second, by the definition of f(z), we know that there must be a z′ ∈ Cz such that f∗adv(z
′) =
f(z) 6= y because f only predicts the label that has been used by f∗adv over some input in the same
connected component. Since Cz is strongly connected by our initial assumption, we must have
z→∗R′ z
′.
Now, because x→∗R z and z→
∗
R′ z
′, we have x→∗R z
′. Since x→∗R z
′ but f∗adv(z
′) 6= y, we can
conclude that f∗adv is not robustly accurate at x, and thus prove the claim.
Claim 3 suggests that f is at least as robustly accurate as f∗adv. Since we know 1) f
∗ is at least as
robustly accurate as f , and 2) f∗adv has the highest possible robust accuracy by definition, we can
conclude that f∗, f and f∗adv have the same robust accuracy and thus complete the proof.
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